The aim of this paper is to consider a dynamic competitive economic equilibrium problem in terms of maximization of utility functions and of excess demand functions. This equilibrium problem is studied by means of a time-dependent quasivariational inequality which is set in the Lebesgue space L 2 0, T , R . This approach allows us to obtain an existence result of timedependent equilibrium solutions.
Introduction
The theory of variational inequality was born in the 1970s, driven by the solution given by G. Fichera to the Signorini problem on the elastic equilibrium of a body under unilateral constraints and by Stampacchia's work on defining the capacitory potential associated to a nonsymmetric bilinear form.
It is possible to attach to this theory a preliminary role in establishing a close relationship between theory and applications in a wide range of problems in mechanics, engineering, mathematical programming, control, and optimization 1-4 . In this paper, a dynamic competitive economic equilibrium problem by using a variational formulation is studied. It was Walras 5 who, in 1874, laid the foundations for the study of the general equilibrium theory, providing a succession of models, each taking into account more aspects of a real economy. The rigorous mathematical formulation of the general equilibrium problem, with possibly nonsmooth but convex data, was elaborated by Arrow and Debreu 6 in the 1954. In 1985, Border in 7 elaborated a variational inequality formulation of a Walrasian price equilibrium. By means of the variational formulation, Dafermos in 8 and Zhao in 9 proved some qualitative results for the solutions to the Walrasian problem in the static case. Moreover, Nagurney and Zhao 10 see also Zhao 9 , Dafermos and Zhao problem over an abstract network with very simple structure that consists of a single origin-destination pair of nodes and single links joining the two nodes. Furthermore, the characterization of Walrasian price equilibrium vectors as solutions of a variational inequality induces efficient algorithms for their computation for further details see also Nagurney's book 12, Chapter 9 , and its complete bibliography .
In 13 it was proven how, by introducing the Lagrange multipliers, a general economic equilibrium with utility function can be represented by a variational inequality problem. In recent years, some papers have been devoted to the study of the influence of time on the equilibrium problems in terms of variational inequality problems in suitable Lebesgue space 14-22 . We refer the interested reader to the book 23 where a variety of problems arising from economics, finance, or transportation science are formulated in Lebesgue spaces. In this paper, we have focused on the generalization of the dynamic case of the competitive economic equilibrium problem studied, in the static case, in 24-26 .
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the evolution in time of the competitive economic equilibrium problem in which the data depend on time t ∈ 0, T and we show how the governing equilibrium conditions can be formulated in terms of an evolutionary quasivariational inequality. By means of this characterization, in Section 3, we are able to give an existence result for the equilibrium solutions by using a two-step procedure. Firstly, we give the existence and uniqueness to the equilibrium consumption and for this equilibrium we achieve a regularity result. Then we are able to prove the existence of the competitive prices.
Walrasian Pure Exchange Model
During a period of time 0, T , T > 0, we consider a marketplace consisting of l different goods indexed by j 1, . . . , l, l > 1, and n agents indexed by a 1, . . . , n.
Each agent a 1, 2, . . . , n is endowed at least with a positive quantity of commodity: 
In this economy, only pure exchanges are assumed: the only activity of each agent is to trade that is buy and sell his own commodities with each other agent. At the time t, agent's preferences for consuming different goods are given by his utility function u a t, x a t defined on 0, T × R l . In this market, the aim of each agent is to maximize their utility, in the period of time 0, T , by performing pure exchanges of the given goods. There are natural constraints that the consumers must satisfy: the wealth of a consumer, in the period 0, T , is his endowment, and the total amount of commodities that a consumer can buy in the period 0, T is at most equal to the total amount of commodities that the consumer sells off during the whole period 0, T . This means that, for all a 1, . . . , n and for all p ∈ P , one has the following maximization problem:
where
2.7
For each a 1, . . . , n and p ∈ P , M a p is a closed and convex set of L.
We assume that the utility function, for each agent a 1, . . . , n, satisfies the following assumptions: and for all j 1, 2, . . . , l and a.e. 0, T :
Our purpose is to give the following characterization.
Theorem 2.2. The pair p, x ∈ P × M p is a dynamic competitive equilibrium of a pure exchange economic market with utility function if and only if it is a solution to the evolutionary quasivariational inequality
Find p, x p ∈ P × M p such that n a 1 ∇u a x a , x a − x a L n a 1 x a p − e a , p − p L ≤ 0 ∀ p, x ∈ P × M p .
2.10
Proof. Firstly, we observe that the pair p, x p ∈ P × M p is a solution to evolutionary quasivariational inequality 2.10 if and only if x p is a solution to evolutionary variational inequality
and p is a solution to evolutionary variational inequality n a 1
Now, we will prove the theorem by means of the following steps. 1 For all p ∈ P , x a ∈ M a p is a solution to the problem 2.6 if and only if x a is a solution to the variational problem
In fact, let us assume that x a is a solution to problem 2.6 ; for all x a ∈ M a p we can define the functional
Journal of Inequalities and Applications

5
For all λ ∈ 0, 1 , it results in the following:
then F · admits the maximum solution when λ 1 and F 1 ≥ 0. Hence we can consider the derivative of F · with respect to λ:
and we obtain
namely, the variational inequality 2.13 . Conversely, let us assume that x a ∈ M a p is a solution to variational problem 2.13 . Since u a t, x a is concave a.e. 0, T , the functional
is concave, then for all x a ∈ M a p , the following estimate holds:
namely, for all λ ∈ 0, 1 :
When λ → 0 , the left-hand side of 2.20 converges to
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Hence x a is a solution to the problem 2.6 . 2 The solution to variational inequality 2.13 belongs to the set
In fact, first of all, let us show that there exists
2.24
Ab absurdum, let us assume that for all x a ∈ C it results in
Then x a is the maximal point of the problem 2.6 on C and from step 1 :
By 2.26 it follows that x j a t > 0 a.e. 0, T for all j 1, . . . , l. In fact, let us suppose that there exist j * and E ⊆ 0, T with m E > 0 such that x j * a t 0 in E. Let us assume in 2.26 x a ∈ C such that Ab absurdum, let us assume that p, x a − e a L < 0 and choose δ > 0 and λ > 0 such that
We have 
2.38
In fact, for the readers' convenience we report the proof of Theorem 1 of 18 . We observe that from Walras' law, the variational inequality 2.38 is equivalent to z p , p L ≤ 0 ∀p ∈ P, 2.39
where z p n a 1 x a p − e a . Let p ∈ P be an equilibrium price vector, that is, it satisfies 2.9 . We have z j p t ≤ 0 a.e. 0, T for each j 1, 2, . . . , l and because p ∈ P , it results in p j t ≥ 0 a.e. 0, T for each j 1, 2, . . . , l. Therefore, z j p t · p j t ≤ 0 a.e. 0, T for each j 1, 2, . . . , l, namely, p is a solution to variational inequalities 2.39 and 2.38 . Viceversa, let p ∈ P be a solution to variational inequality 2.39 or 2.38 . Suppose that there exist an index i and a subset E ⊆ 0, T with m E > 0 such that
2.40
Let us assume in 2.39 , p ∈ P such that
2.41
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2.42
Existence Results
In this section we are concerned with the problem of the existence of the dynamic competitive equilibrium, by using the variational theory.
Existence and Regularity of the Equilibrium Consumption
Firstly, for all price p ∈ P and for all a 1, . . . , n, let us consider evolutionary variational inequality 2.13 that is equivalent to
We suppose that the operator −∇u a x a is an affine operator: 
3.3
Since A a t is a positive defined matrix for all p ∈ P , there exists a unique solution x a p to evolutionary variational inequality 3.1 . Then the excess demand function arises
x a p − e a .
3.4
Now, our goal is to give a regularity result for the evolutionary variational inequality 3.1 , in particular, we prove that x a · is continuous on P . In order to achieve the continuity result, we need to recall the concept of set convergence in the sense of Mosco see, e.g., 27 .
Definition 3.1 see 27 . Let V, · be an Hilbert space K ⊂ V a closed, nonempty, convex set. A sequence of nonempty, closed, convex sets K n converges to K as n → ∞, that is, K n → K, if and only if M1 for any H ∈ K, there exists a sequence {H n } n∈N strongly converging to H in V such that H n lies in K n for all n, M2 for any {H k n } n∈N weakly converging to H in V , such that H k n lies in K k n for all n, then the weak limit H belongs to K.
Definition 3.2 see, e.g., 28 . A sequence of operators A n : K n → V converges to an operator
hold with fixed constants M, ν > 0 and M3 the sequence {A n H n } n∈N strongly converges to AH in V , for any sequence {H n } n∈N ⊂ K n strongly converging to H ∈ K. Now, we remember an abstract result due to Mosco on stability of solutions to a variational inequality. More precisely, let A ∈ R n×n and B ∈ R n , find H ∈ K such that 
converge strongly to the solution H of the limit problem 3.6 , that is,
Let p ∈ P fixed and let {p n } n∈N ⊆ P be a sequence such that p n → p ∈ P . We prove that M a p n → M a p in Mosco's sense, that is, it is enough to show that M1 and M2 hold.
Let x a p ∈ M a p . We pose
namely,
, and
Let us verify that x a p n ∈ M a p n for all n ∈ N. From the right-hand side of 3.11 it results in what follows: For all n ∈ N, we have x a p n ∈ M a p n . Furthermore, by
because η n → 0, it follows that
Hence, M1 holds. We prove M2 . Let {x a p k n } a sequence such that x a p k n ∈ M a p k n is weakly convergent to x a p . We prove that x a p ∈ M a p :
By choosing g j t ≥ 0 for all j 1, . . . , l a.e. 0, T , one has it results in what follows:
3.22
Since x a p k n ∈ M a p k n , one has Proof. We have that A n → A in the sense of M3 . In fact, a for each n ∈ N and x a p n , y a p n ∈ M a p n , since A a is bounded in 0, T , there exists K > 0 such that 
By Theorem 3.3, the sequence {x a p n }, where, for all n ∈ N, x a p n is the unique solution of
converges strongly to the solution x a p of the limit problem 3.1 , that is,
Hence, we have proved that for all p n strongly converging to p, x a p n strongly converges to x a p , then x a p is continuous on P .
Existence of Competitive Prices and Existence of Equilibrium
Let us assume the following regularity condition:
namely, for all ε > 0 ∃δ > 0 such that p t h − p t L < ε for all h ∈ R, |h| < δ and for all p ∈ P . This is condition interpreted as the uniform integral continuity of price and for example it is satisfied by all the functions:
where C is a positive constant and α ∈ 0, 1 see, e.g., 29 . Let us consider the evolutionary variational inequality:
3.32
In order to prove an existence result of solutions to 3.31 , we recall the following. 
